This paper analyses how increased integration and the ongoing enlargement of European Union's internal market affected the performance of Swedish manufacturing firms. The pro-competitive effect of international trade, in term of intensified import competition on domestic firms' market power, has been investigated extensively at industry-level. In contrast to previous studies, this analysis is based on detailed firm-level information and import data divided into both an EU member group and a group of recently proved EU member candidates. It focuses on how imports from these groups, together with imports from other non-European trading partners, impact on firm-level profitability, while taken firm-specific efficiency effects into account. The findings are that import from the new EU-candidates seems to have a substantial disciplinary effect on firm-level profits, whereas import from EU-member countries only appears to have an impact on firms with large market shares and in highly concentrated industries.
Introduction
Import competition has been regarded as a disciplinary device to constrain market power of domestic firms. At industry level and within the structure-conduct-performance paradigm, this disciplinary effect of import on profit margins has been investigated extensively. For Sweden, there are two earlier studies, Stålhammar (1991) and Hansson (1992) , carried out on manufacturing industries in the 1980s. Yet so far, as pointed out by Tybout (2001) , only a handful of studies have tried to explain cross-firm variation in profits using a combination of industrywide and firm-specific factors. Furthermore, firm level data provides a possibility to shed some lights on the controversial question whether the often found positive correlation between profitability and concentration at the industry level is due to intra-industry efficiency differences, exercising of market power, or both.
In the paper I use a conjectural variation model, where the idea is that firms' conjectures concerning import penetration, and thus their reactions, differ with respect to the countries of origin. The import is divided into five different country groups to determine whether the strength of import discipline varies by the origin of imports. The European Union countries − as being Sweden's most important trading partners − and the European Union candidates are of specific interest. Moreover, the interaction effects between industry level characteristics, such as import penetration and producer concentration, and firm-specific characteristics, such as market share, are examined in more detail.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the data and gives some descriptive facts on the exposure and the development of foreign competition in Swedish manufacturing in the 1990s. Section 4 sets out the empirical specifications and shows the results. Section 5 concludes.
A theoretical background
This section aims to illustrate three major points. 
Firm level efficiency versus industry level concentration
In the classical tradition of industrial economics the industry or the market is the unit of study. Differences among firms are assumed transitory or unimportant. In general equilibrium industry profitability is assumed to be determined primarily by the ability of established firms to restrict rivalry among themselves and by protection through barriers to entry. A key hypothesis is that higher concentration tends to raise industry-wide profits by facilitating collusion (Scherer & Ross 1990) . To illustrate how concentration and firm-level efficiency affect price-cost margins, I
utilize the model developed by Clarke & Davies (1982) .
Let us assume an industry in a closed economy with n firms that produce a homogenous good. The i:th firm has the following profit function:
where is profit, is output and c is marginal cost of firm i.
Marginal cost is assumed to be constant and all firms set the same price p on the homogenous good.
The inverse demand function is:
The first-order condition for firm i's profit maximization with respect to its output is:
Equation (3) is rewritten in term of firm i's Lerner index , which can be considered as a measure of its market power.
where the market elasticity of demand
is firm i's conjecture about its competitors' reaction to its output change. Equation (4) shows that at the firm level the Lerner index or the price-cost margin PCM depends on firm i's market
To describe firms' conjecture in more detail, I follow Clarke & Davies (1982) where the conjecture is defined as:
where α is a parameter indicating the degree of competition between producers; 0 = α means that Cournot conjectures prevail, while perfect collusion is approached as α tends to be 1. By using (6) in (5) I obtain: 
Equation (12), in combination with equation (9), shows that concentration (and price-cost margin) will be higher when cost/efficiency differences among firms, measured by the coefficient of variation of marginal cost , are greater.
This provides support for the argument that the positive relationship between industry profitability and market concentration may be explained by higher efficiency of the largest firms. 
where q is total quantity demanded, q is quantity produced by domestic firm i, and is the quantity imported from region k. 
Substituting (17a) and (17b) into (15) gives another expression of the Lerner index (price-cost margin) at the firm level.
The market share of the domestic firms , where is the share of import from region k in consumption, , and is the domestic firm i's share of total domestic output,
. The larger the market share of firm i , the higher the PCM on firm level. We also notice that the market share interacts with import competition in determining PCM.
Summing over the n domestic firms in (18) ϕ , the more likely the imports from region k has a disciplinary effect on PCM. The equations (18) and (19) are key equations on
The sufficient condition for a disciplinary effect of imports
which the empirical analyses at firm-and industry level in section 4 are based on.
Data and import penetration in Swedish manufacturing
The data I use include firm-level data on profit, output, capital stock, employment and wage for firms with more than 50 employees in Swedish manufacturing for the period 1990-1999.
This gives me a panel consisting of 3197 unique firms belonging to 93 manufacturing industries at the 3-digit level of the SNI92
classification. The coverage of the panel in terms of total manufacturing employment is around 70 percent. Notes: Table A2 in Appendix gives a more detailed description of the countries included in each country group. The firm level data has then been linked to data on exports by industries and imports by industries and trading partners from
Statistics Sweden. Table 1 shows the trends in the import share from various country groups of consumption in the 1990s. 6 We observe that Swedish manufacturing is highly exposed to import competition. More than half of the consumption of manufacturing products comes from abroad and the share has increased over the 1990s. Most of the manufacturing import originates from the EU member countries and the distribution of import shares among country groups has been relatively stable. Nevertheless, we notice a modest increase in the import shares from EU members and the EU candidate countries and a slight fall in the import share from Japan and Asian NICs.
Empirical analysis
Two basic types of empirical models are analyzed. To compare my result with earlier industry level studies, I start off in section 4.1, from a conventional industry level model. After that I proceed in section 4.2, and estimate a more appropriate firm level model, which enables me to control for and separate competition effects from efficiency effects.
The conventional industry-level model
To determine the impact of import on profitability at industry level, I estimate the following regression equation (cf. equation (19)):
where is the price-cost margin in industry i at time t and is defined as (value added − payroll)/value added. is the same industry level measure of import penetration as discussed above, i.e. the import share for country group k in consumption. is the Herfindahl index. is the logarithm of the capital stock per employee at industry level. Since the numerator of PCM
consists of both pure profit and capital compensation, capital intensity is included as a control variable in the regression.
are year dummies and are industry dummies defined at the 3-digit level of the SNI92 classification.
DI
In the model in equation (20) I allow for differences in the disciplinary effects of imports depending on the countries of origin, i.e. I let γ vary between country groups k. To a large extent the integration among the present EU members has, due to similarities in income and factor endowments, resulted in increased intra-industry and intra-firm trade. One may therefore expect less competitive impact of imports originating from these countries than of imports from more dissimilar countries (Jacquemin & Sapir 1991) . Of particular interest for the future European integration is the effect of imports from the recently proved EU candidate countries. Hansson (1992) Asian NICs, and other high-income countries into a high-income country group and EU10 and and other low-income countries to a low-income country group. EU, the penetration ratios will then be negatively correlated. (20) and 
8 According to rules of thumb applied to VIF, there is evidence of multicollinearity if the largest VIF is greater than 10 and the mean of all VIFs is considerable larger than 1 (Chatterjee, Hadi & Price 2000) . Table 3 Interactions between import penetration and concentration at industry level In Table 3 we observe that it is only import competition from highincome countries (column 3) and the EU member countries (column 5) that have the expected impact on PCM in concentrated industries and this effect disappears in specifications with fixed industry effects (columns 4 and 6).
To evaluate the varying impact of import penetration on PCM in more or less concentrated industries, I calculate the marginal effect of increased import competition on PCM. Disregarding the possibility that import competition affects concentration, we may derive the expression for marginal effect from equation (21) as:
By using the estimate of k γ and k ϕ in Table 3 and the average concentration ratios in the first and the third quartiles of the industry distribution of the Herfindahl index I get values of the marginal effect of import penetration, which are shown in Table 4 . Table 4 demonstrates that the result I obtained earlier in Table 2 appears to hold when interactions between import penetration and concentration are taken into account. The disciplinary effect of imports on industry level price-cost margins comes from imports originating from low-income countries and the EU candidate countries.
Firm-level analysis: Market power or efficiency?
As I mentioned above, the most important reason for using firm level data is to control for and separate competition effects and efficiency effects. As shown by equation (18) and as argued by, e.g. Tybout (2001) , higher profits do not necessarily only reflect deficient competition pressure. High profits may also be due to higher efficiency or large sunk cost. Firm level analysis provides a possibility to distinguish whether the profitability of a firm is correlated with its efficiency and lead to a larger market share, or whether profitability, as a result of oligopolistic coordination between firms within industries, is correlated with concentration, or both.
To determine the impact of imports on profitability on firm level I estimate the following regression equation (cf. equation (18) share affects the PCM of the firm if the firm is able to segment markets and price discriminate. Whether prices and margins will be higher on the export market depends on the relative elasticity of 9 Import penetration can only be observed at the industry level so when firm level data is used the import penetration variable takes the same value for firms within same industry. 10 Relative total factor productivity RTFP is defined as the ratio of TFP in firm j to average TFP in industry i at time t. Hansson & Lundin (2003) Appendix 2 gives a detailed description of how TFP has been calculated. jit demand for the firm's product at home and abroad. This means that we cannot a priori determine the sign of the effect of the export share on PCM.
The results of the firm level analysis in Table 5 point out that the disciplinary effect of imports from low-income countries, or more specifically, from the EU candidate countries remain negative and significant. Moreover, and in contrast to the industry level analysis in Table 2 , the imports from Japan and Asian NIC turn out to be negative and significant.
The market share appears, at least in columns (3) and (5) A notable difference between the industry-and the firm level analyses is that adjusted is considerably lower in the firm level analysis (0.03 compared to 0.55), which is not unusual in this kind of structure-conduct studies using micro-level data. Measurement error is another well-known problem in structureconduct studies. The results in Table 5 would be more convincing if they are robust to the use of alternative measures of the variables. Re-estimating the same firm-level models as in Table 5 , but instead of PCM, I use operating surplus divided by turnover as measure of excess profit and replace import penetration ratios with import shares and these robustness checks yield very similar results. Table 6 shows the results:
Interestingly, the results indicate that the import penetration effects work quite differently for the import from EU members and for the import from EU candidate countries. For the EU member countries, the coefficient is negative and significant on the interaction term of market share and import penetration. Thus, the imports from EU member countries appear to have a disciplinary effect on firms with large market shares. For the EU candidate 13 See Appendix Table A3 . 14 This kind of interactions can also be thought of as allowing the regression coefficient to depend linearly upon other regressors. It can be an efficient way to capture the effect shifts among relative large number of heterogeneous firms. Interaction effects are also estimated for the total import penetration ratio and import penetration from high-and low-income countries. The results are not presented here but can be obtained upon request.
countries the result indicates the opposite. However, there is a large negative and significant effect of import penetration separately, which is consistent with the result I obtained in the specification without interaction term in Table 5 . 
Concluding remarks
This paper has examined how price-cost margins in Swedish manufacturing are affected by the increased international integration in the 1990s, in particular the launch and the ongoing enlargement of the European Union's internal market. The results, from both the industry level and the firm level analyses, show that import penetration from low-income countries, and more specifically, from the EU candidate countries has a disciplinary effect on price-cost margins. This outcome is robust to alternative profit and import competition measures. Moreover, the results indicate that the impact of import penetration from EU members on price-cost margins at industry level is higher in more concentrated industries. At the firm level, import penetration from EU members has a negative effect on profitability in firms with large market shares. This suggests that a disciplinary effect of import competition from EU members is felt among large Swedish producers.
The hypotheses that concentration and barriers to entry facilitate firms' opportunities to increase their mark-ups get somewhat mixed support. Capital requirements − an indicator of barriers to entry have a positive and clearly significant effect on profitability.
The coefficient on the concentration ratio, on the other hand, is positive indeed, but rarely significant, especially if concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index. Yet, in the firm level analysis a firm's market share is positively related to its profitability, which is consistent with the maintained idea that efficient firms are larger and have higher profits.
An extension of earlier studies is that a firm-specific efficiency variable − firm's relative productivity performance measured by total factor productivity TFP − is included into the analysis. This additional firm control variable has the expected positive effect on profitability, which confirms that more efficient firms have higher profits. Interestingly, after this efficiency related variable has been included, the firm's market share still remains to have an effect on the firm's price-cost margin. A possible interpretation is that, while the concentration ratio reflects potential implicit collusion at the industry level, the market share may capture a single firm's prospect to exercise market power. Thus, the result point to that,
given that efficiency related differences among firms are taken into account, large Swedish manufacturing firms appear to take advantage of their market power.
In sum, the results from the industry-and the firm level analyses are not contradictory, rather complementary. The evidence of procompetitive effects of import competition can be observed from the direct effect of the penetration from EU candidate countries or from the indirect effect of the penetration from EU members through an interaction with concentration ratios on industry level or market shares of firms. 
